“the very idea of an autistic person is a philosophical one’’ — Stuart Murray. 2011. Autism.
In the introduction to their 2012 edited volume, The Philosophy of Autism, philosophers Jami L. Anderson and Simon Cushing propose that the “subject of autism is rich with philosophical possibilities”. Nonetheless, most philosophical research on autism restricts itself to questions in ethics, and the philosophy of mind, pscyhology, or medicine. Hence why the philosopher Kenneth A. Richman suggests—in an editorial co-authored with the Professor of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Science, Sven Bölte—that “the philosophy of autism is not (or not yet) a subfield of philosophy”. Much philosophical work merely invokes autism as a thought experiment rather than engaging directly with the challenge that neurodiversity (in general) and autism in particular raises for prominent philosophical theories of language, mind, agency, responsibility, and normativity, and others.
Despite the narrow focus of philosophical engagement with autism, a much wider range of philosophical issues—particularly in the philosophy and metaphysics of science, epistemology, political philosophy, and the philosophy of disability—are apparent. For example, philosophers might debate whether autism is a deficit (as per the medical model of disability) or a difference (as per the neurodiversity perspective on autism); each of these views has important implications for how we think about, conceptualise, and intervene upon the lives of autistic individuals. Neurodiversity has moral, political, and practical implications for the rights and obligations of autistic individuals and broader society. The philosophical literature on autism could (or should) engage with a wide range of complex and nuanced issues that have important consequences for how we think about autism and disability. Furthermore, autistic perspectives can be brought to bear on philosophical questions. For example, autism calls into question some prominent philosophical theories of language, mind, agency, responsibility, and normativity.
This research project project seeks to critically examine philosophical perspectives on autism—the ‘philosophy of autism’ component—and advance autistic perspectives on philosophical theories—the “autistic philosophy” component. In doing so, this project seeks to centre autistic voices and correct harmful misinformation that has proliferated in philosophical discourse about autism to date.
The first concrete objective of this research project is to conduct a scoping review of philosophical work on autism to map the current research landscape and highlight gaps in the literature—particularly the gap created by the lack of autistic scholars working on the subject. This review will empirically validate some of the anecdotal claims made above and lay the foundation for the philosophy of autism as a proper research subject; this is the “philosophy of autism” component of the proposal and the primary goal of the project’s first year.
In addition, this project seeks to clarify the benefits of neurodiverse approaches to existing philosophical research and theories. Many philosophers—based on experiments from the 1980s—uncritically assume that autistics lack a theory of mind. They then draw philosophical consequences from this assumption; for example, some researchers argue that “if autistics lack a theory of mind, they lack empathy” (Baron-Cohen 2005). This latter consequence implies that autistics cannot live a “good life” (in the philosophical sense). However, recent work—especially by autistic scholars—gives lie to such assumptions (Milton 2012; Yergeau 2018; Chapman 2020). Thus, as a second goal, this project seeks to correct stigmatising misinformation about autism that has been reflected in, and perpetuated by, uncritical philosophical work on the subject.
